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A 
JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Appellant asserts the following three issues on appeal: 
1. Issue: Whether the trial court erred in ordering Cache Valley Bank to pay 
Bud Bailey Construction the total amount of $17,901.94 then existing in the deposit 
account of Construction Associates.. 
Standard of Review: The applicable standard of review for a trial court's 
factual findings is the "clearly erroneous" standard. Young v. Young, 979 P.2d 338, 
342 (Utah 1999). The standard of review for a trial court's legal conclusions is 
correctness. Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998). Generally, the 
standard of review for the deteraiination of the amount of sanctions to be awarded is 
abuse of discretion. Morton v. Continental Baking Co., 938 P.2d 271, 274 (Utah 
1997). 
Preservation of Issue: This issue is preserved by appeal from the trial 
court's Order which included the determination set forth. 
5 
2. Issue: Whether the trial court failed to adequately justify its assessment 
against Cache Valley Bank by stating its findings of fact and conclusions of law in 
accordance with Rule 52. 
Standard of Review: The trial court's interpretation of a rule of procedure 
is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. Brown v. Glover, 16 P.3d 540, 
544 (Utah 2000). 
Preservation of Issue: This issue is preserved by appeal from the trial 
court's Order which included the determination of the issue set forth. 
3. Issue: Whether the trial court erred in awarding attorneys' fees to Bud 
Bailey Construction for services connected to legal matters upon which it did not 
prevail and which were not causally related to Cache Valley Bank's failure to 
adequately answer the interrogatory served with the Writ of Garnishment. 
Standard of Review: The standard of review for a trial court's compliance 
with an appellate court's decision on remand is correction of error. Slattery v. Covey 
& Co,, 909 P.2d 925, 927 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). The standard of review for the 
amount of attorneys' fee awarded is abuse of discretion. Pennington v. Allstate Ins. 
Co., 973 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1998). 
Preservation of Issue: This issue is preserved by appeal from the trial 
court's Order which included the determination of the issue set forth. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Issue 1: Whether the trial court erred in ordering Cache Valley Bank to pay to 
Bud Bailey Construction the total amount of $17,901.94 then existing in the deposit 
account of Construction Associates. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 64D(j)(2). Writ of Garnishment 
(j) Liability of garnishee. 
(j)(2) If the garnishee fails to comply with this rule, the writ or an order of the 
court, the court may order the garnishee to appear and show cause why the 
garnishee should not be ordered to pay such amounts as are just, including the 
value of the property or the balance of the judgment, whichever is less, and 
reasonable costs and attorney fees incurred by parties as a result of the garnishee's 
failure. If the garnishee shows that the steps taken to secure the property were 
reasonable, the court may excuse the garnishee's liability in whole or in part. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52. Findings by the court; correction of 
the record, 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory 
jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of 
law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 5 8 A; 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4. Process. 
(d) Method of Service. Unless waived in writing, service of the summons and 
complaint shall be by one of the following methods: 
(d)(1)(E) Upon any corporation not herein otherwise provided for, upon a 
partnership or upon an unincorporated association which is subject to suit under a 
common name, by delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to an 
officer, a managing or general agent, or other agent authorized by appointment or 
by law to receive service of process and, if the agent is one authorized by statute to 
receive service and the statute so requires, by also mailing a copy of the summons 
and the complaint to the defendant. If no such officer or agent can be found within 
the state, and the defendant has, or advertises or holds itself out as having, an 
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office or place of business within the state or elsewhere, or does business within 
this state or elsewhere, then upon the person in charge of such office or place of 
business; 
Issue 2: Whether the trial court failed to adequately justify its assessment 
against Cache Valley Bank by stating its findings of fact and conclusions of law in 
accordance with Rule 52. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52. Findings by the court; correction of 
the record. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory 
jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of 
law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 5 8 A; 
Issue 3: Issue: Whether the trial court erred in awarding attorneys' fees to Bud 
Bailey Construction for services connected to legal matters upon which it did not 
prevail and which were not causally related to Cache Valley Bank's failure to 
adequately answer the interrogatory served with the Writ of Garnishment. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 64D(j)(2). Writ of Garnishment. 
(j) Liability of garnishee. 
(j)(2) If the garnishee fails to comply with this rule, the writ or an order of the 
court, the court may order the garnishee to appear and show cause why the 
garnishee should not be ordered to pay such amounts as are just, including the 
value of the property or the balance of the judgment, whichever is less, and 
reasonable costs and attorney fees incurred by parties as a result of the garnishee's 
failure. If the garnishee shows that the steps taken to secure the property were 
reasonable, the court may excuse the garnishee's liability in whole or in part. 
R 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52. Findings by the court; correction of 
the record. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory 
jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of 
law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 5 8 A; 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case is a dispute over the amount, if any, Cache Valley Bank (the "Bank), 
the Appellant herein, should be obligated to pay to Bud Bailey Construction ("Bud 
Bailey"), Appellee, solely for its failure to respond to one of the questions in a 
garnishment interrogatory and the proper award of attorneys' fees resulting from the 
same. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Bud Bailey applied for and obtained the issuance of a Writ of Garnishment 
which was delivered1 to the Bank on November 1, 2006. (R. 98-100). The Bank 
made its answer to the Writ of Garnishment on November 6, 2006, stating that 
$17,901.94 was in the checking account of judgment debtor, Construction Associates. 
(R. 101-104). The Bank's response failed to include a statement to the effect that it 
had a lien upon the proceeds in the account and was asserting a right to offset those 
funds. (R. 102). Construction Associates did not file a reply or request a hearing. The 
Bank remitted no funds to Bud Bailey. 
On January 23, 2007, Bud Bailey made a Motion for Order to Show Cause in 
re Contempt directed to the Bank. (R. 112-121). The Order was issued by the Court 
1
 The term "delivered" is used to denote that there is an issue regarding the method of 
the purported service on Cache Valley Bank. There is a discussion of this problem in 
the Argument at Part IV. 
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and again delivered2 to the Bank on or about January 29, 2007. (R. 122-132). A 
hearing was held on February 12, 2006, and after some confusion about notice3 the 
Bank appeared telephonically. (R. 133-134). At the hearing, counsel for the Bank 
explained that the Bank had a perfected security interest in all the bank accounts of 
the judgment debtor, Construction Associates. (R. 133-134). The hearing was reset 
for February 26, 2007, and at that time the Bank filed its written Response to the 
Garnishment and Order to Show Cause in re Contempt. (R. 135-158). 
In addition to contesting that proper service had occurred, the Bank's 
Response, claimed that it had an unlimited right to setoff the bank deposit account and 
that it had done so upon receiving the Writ of Garnishment. The Bank provided 
evidence in the form of Exhibits to its Response that it had a number of loans to 
Construction Associates, all of which were delinquent and in default. The Bank's 
Response showed that the notes and security agreements with Construction Associates 
provided that the Bank was given an unlimited right to setoff any bank deposit funds. 
Further, that the Bank was secured on the deposited funds by reason of security 
agreements and its position as the bank holding the deposit accounts. Documents 
supporting all these claims were attached to the Bank's Response. (R. 135-158). 
At the conclusion of those hearings the trial court entered a judgment against 
the Bank in the amount of $41,049.11. (R. 234-243). The bases of its award were as 
follows: 
2
 Id. 
'id. 
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(1) The Bank failed to state it was offsetting the $17, 901.94 in its initial 
response of November 6, 2006, and hence, was not in compliance with the 
garnishment statute as of January 25, 2007, when the trial court issued its 
Order to Show Cause. 
(2) The Bank offset all the bank deposit funds of $ 17,901.94, on November 17, 
2006, and applied the same against a Bank debt owed by Construction 
Associates.4 
(3) That after November 1, 2006, an additional $41,789.52 was deposited to the 
Construction Associates bank deposit account through February 28, 2007. 
(4) The trial court found that the Bank "instead of complying with the 
garnishment and order of the Court" allowed Construction Associates "...to 
continue to write checks from said account(s) [after November 6] and did 
allow those checks to clear Cache Valley Bank to pay third-parties while the 
valid garnishment of Bud Bailey was in place.55 
(5) The Bank's acts in allowing continued use of the bank account were 
"circumventing a valid judgment and valid garnishment.55 
(6) The Bank's actions [in allowing continued use of the account] "violated the 
Order of this Court and as a result Garnishee Cache Valley Bank is in 
Contempt of the Order to Show Cause dated January 25, 2007.55 
The funds were setoff from the deposit account on November 1, 2007, moved to the 
suspense account and then paid on the Construction Associates loan on November 17. 
(R. 202-232) 
1? 
(7) Garnishee Cache Valley Bank is ".. .ordered to pay the sum remaining on the 
Garnishment in the amount of $38,769.71 plus Bud Bailey's attorneys' 
fees.. .in the amount of $2,279.40." 
The Bank filed its appeal from this Order on June 8, 2007. (R. 244-257). 
On appeal, the Bank's primary argument was that the trial court erred in 
extending the Writ of Garnishment to subsequent deposits made by Construction 
Associates to the bank account. The Bank also argued that it had the right to offset 
the bank account both at the time of the Garnishment and thereafter.5 
On the primary issue, this Court ruled that the trial court erred when it 
extended the Writ of Garnishment to include subsequent deposits made to 
Construction Associates' account with the Bank. (R. 282). This Court did not address 
the issue of offset due to its resolution of the forgoing issue. (R. 282). This Court also 
reversed the trial court's award of attorneys' fees. (R. 283). 
This case was remanded to the trial court".. .for a determination of what 
amount, if any, Bank should be required to pay solely for its failure to adequately 
answer the interrogatory served with the writ." (R. 283). This Court noted that the 
maximum amount that could be awarded to Bud Bailey was limited to the amount of 
property held by the Bank at the time the Writ was served, $17,901.94 plus reasonable 
costs and attorneys' fees if deemed appropriate. (R. 283). 
5
 Other minor issues included whether service of the Writ of Garnishment upon Cache 
Valley Bank complied with Rule 4 and as to granting attorneys' fees to Bud Bailey 
Construction. 
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The trial court held a hearing on the remanded issue on January 20, 2010, and 
the parties presented oral argument. (R. 324). Prior to the hearing, each party filed a 
Position Statement with respect to the amount, if any, that should be assessed to the 
Bank for its failure to adequately answer the Garnishment Interrogatory. (R. 304-323). 
On remand, Bud Bailey relied upon the previous pleadings and argued that the 
trial court should award it $17,901.94, the full amount of the property held by the 
Bank at the time the Writ was served, plus reasonable costs and attorneys' fees. (R. 
307). Bud Bailey argued that the full amount should be awarded because the Bank 
failed in its initial interrogatory response to claim a right to an offset and this 
constituted the Bank's failure to abide by a valid judgment and a valid garnishment 
issued by the trial court. (R. 307). 
The Bank argued that the only issue before the trial court was the amount of 
damages, if any, to be assessed solely for its failure to complete the question as to its 
claims in the garnishment interrogatory. (R. 312). The Bank argued that there was 
little if any damage resulting from the failure to answer the question to whether the 
Bank had a claim on the funds. (R. 319). The Bank argued that the damage flowing 
from the error would be limited to the costs and expenses directly relating to the 
failure to complete the interrogatory itself. (R. 319). The Bank argued that once Bud 
Bailey was advised that the Bank did in fact have a lien and that it was asserting and 
entitled to offset the funds, the damages would cease. Based thereon some modest 
attorneys fees associated with the delay in obtaining that information could be 
considered; that delay being the time from when the incomplete answer was given to 
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the time the complete answer was provided. (R. 320). The Bank also pointed out that 
the problem in this matter was that Bud Bailey believed that the Bank had no right to 
offset the funds. Furthermore, that this legal error is what led to the first proceeding, 
its resulting Order that was appealed and ultimately reversed and remanded by this 
Court. (R. 320). 
After hearing these arguments, on March 8,2010., the trial court issued its 
Ruling on Remand Issue. (R. 325-333). Upon submission of a proposed Order and 
Attorneys Fees by Bud Bailey implementing that Memorandum Ruling, the Bank 
filed an Objection. (R. 341-344). The Bank objected on the grounds that the Proposed 
Order contained no findings of fact, conclusions of law upon which the decision was 
based, additionally there was no determination or basis entered regarding the 
appropriateness of attorneys5 fees. The Bank further argued Bud Bailey improperly 
sought attorneys' fees for services unrelated to the issue on remand and improperly 
sought costs incurred in the filing and service of the Garnishment. (R. 342-343). 
On April 27, 2010, the trial court entered its Order on the Remand Issue. (R. 
349-352). The Ruling on Remand Issue and Order thereon provided as follows: 
(1) That the Bank failed to provide adequate justification for its failure to 
adequately respond to the Garnishment Interrogatory. 
(2) That the Bank presented no evidence that the service upon its administrative 
assistant was improper. 
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(3) That the Bank presented no evidence linking its failure to properly respond to 
the Garnishment Interrogatory to the improper service of the same on its 
administrative assistant. 
(4) That the Bank was vicariously liable for the administrative assistant's 
improper acceptance of the Writ of Garnishment under the doctrine of 
respondeat superior. 
(5) That the Bank held $ 17,901.94 in the checking account for Construction 
Associates at the time Bud Bailey served its Writ of Garnishment. 
(6) That the Bank failed to properly respond to Bud Bailey's Garnishment 
Interrogatories by leaving blank the section regarding claimed offsets for 
amounts owed to it by Construction Associates in contravention of Rule 64D. 
(7) That the amount to be assessed against the Bank for its failure to adequately 
respond to the Garnishment Interrogatory was $17,901.94, plus Bud Bailey's 
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. 
On April 27, 2010, the trial court also entered its Order on the Bank's 
Objection to the Proposed Order and Attorneys' Fees. (R. 345-348). This Order 
provided as follows: 
(1) The proposed order was consistent with and adequately reflected the trial 
court's Ruling on Remand Issue. 
(2) That the inclusion of a verbatim recitation of the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in the proposed order was unnecessary. 
1 C 
(3) That the award of attorneys' fees and costs against the Bank was reasonable 
and the same were authorized by Utah Court of Appeal's opinion and Rule 
64D(j)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(4) That the costs of filing and service of the Garnishment on the Bank were not 
properly included in the Affidavit of Attorneys' Fees and Costs submitted by 
Bud Bailey because the same were not a result of the Bank's failure to 
properly respond to the Garnishment Interrogatory. 
On May 27,2010, the Bank filed its appeal from the Order on Remand Issue 
and Order on Objection to Proposed Order and Attorneys' Fees. (R. 353-368) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The trial court made no formal Findings of Fact in this matter. However, 
undisputed facts can be gleaned from the Orders entered and the various pleadings 
and exhibits provided to the trial court. 
1. Bud Bailey obtained a default judgment against Construction Associates 
on April 5, 2006. (R. 72-74). 
2. Construction Associates had a deposit checking account with the Bank. 
(R. 176-180). 
3. Bud Bailey caused to be issued a Writ of Garnishment against that deposit 
account and any other accounts of Construction Associates at the Bank on October 19, 
2006. (R. 98-100). 
4. The Writ of Garnishment was delivered to Lori Parker, an administrative 
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assistant/secretary at the Bank on November 1, 2006. (R. 235). 
5. Ms. Parker is not a registered agent, manager or officer of the Bank. (R. 
136,163-65, 187-88). 
6. The Bank's only registered agent is this counsel, N. George Daines at 108 
North Main, Logan, Utah 84321. (R. 136, 163-65). 
7. As of November 1, 2006, the Bank had three loans owed to it by 
Defendant Construction Associates dba KRT Drywall, all of which were in default. 
(R. 218, 220-222, 224-227). 
8. Ms. Gunnell, a bookkeeping assistant, responded to the Garnishment 
Interrogatories with the Garnishee's Answers on November 6, 2006, stating that on 
November 1, 2006, the Bank had $17,901.94 in the said account. Ms. Gunnell did not 
provide an answer to Question #3; the place to answer was left blank. (R. 101-104). 
9. On November 1, 2006, the Bank offset $ 17,901.94 from the Construction 
Associates account to the Bank's suspense account. On November 17, 2006, the 
Bank then applied that sum against a loan owed by Construction Associates that was 
in default, Loan #51-027480. (R. 214, 216). 
10. The Bank had a security interest in Construction Associates' deposit 
account at the time the Writ of Garnishment was served that was perfected by control 
as well as a security agreement and financing statement. (R. 146-158, 209). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. Issue: Whether the trial court erred in ordering Cache Valley Bank to pay to 
Bud Bailey Construction the total amount of $17,901.94 then existing in the deposit 
account of Construction Associates. 
Summary: This Court remanded this matter to the trial court for a 
determination of the damages which resulted from the Bank's failure to completely 
answer the Garnishment Interrogatory. The trial court was to determine what 
damages to assess for this omission. The Bank corrected this omission early on in 
these proceedings by informing Bud Bailey that it had a right to offset the account and 
had done so. The amount to assess against the Bank should be measured by the 
damages that resulted from the time of the omission to the time of correction of the 
omission. The trial court and counsel for Bud Bailey instead undertook to determine 
what Bud Bailey would have received had the Bank not had a right to offset the funds 
in the account. Additionally, they added on legal fees completely unrelated to the 
omission, but entirely related to the erroneous legal theories that Bud Bailey argued in 
the first appeal. The Bank also asserts that original service was improper and that 
when this factor was considered by the trial court it resulted in erroneous conclusions 
of law and insufficient factual findings. 
II. Issue: Whether the trial court failed to adequately justify its assessment against 
Cache Valley Bank by stating its findings of fact and conclusions of law in 
accordance with Rule 52. 
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Summary: The trial court's Ruling on Remand Issue and Orders do not 
comply with Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court's 
findings do not contain facts or conclusions of law sufficient to determine the 
justification of its assessment against Cache Valley Bank. 
III. Issue: The trial court erred in awarding attorneys' fees to Bud Bailey 
Construction for services connected to legal matters upon which it did not prevail and 
which were not causally related to Cache Valley Bank's failure to adequately answer 
the interrogatory served with the Writ of Garnishment. 
Summary: The award of attorneys' fees was to be limited to those incurred as 
a result of the Bank's failure to adequately respond to the Garnishment Interrogatory 
and only if deemed appropriate by the trial court. The trial court failed to comply 
with Rule 64D and this Court's Opinion when it awarded Bud Bailey attorneys' fees 
that were unrelated to the issue on remand. The trial court also failed to provide 
findings of fact sufficient to assess the appropriateness of the attorneys' fees that were 
awarded. 
70 
ARGUMENT 
I. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING CACHE 
VALLEY BANK TO PAY BUD BAILEY CONSTRUCTION THE TOTAL 
AMOUNT OF $17,901.94 THEN EXISTING IN THE DEPOSIT ACCOUNT OF 
CONSTRUCTION ASSOCIATES. 
This Court remanded this case to the trial court ".. .for a determination of what 
amount, if any, Bank should be required to pay solely for its failure to answer 
adequately the interrogatory served with the Writ." (R. 283) (emphasis added). The 
sole issue before the trial court on remand was a determination of what if any funds 
the Bank should be required to pay for its failure to initially adequately answer the 
interrogatory served with the Writ of Garnishment. The ruling of the Court of 
Appeals sustained the Bank's legal position that it had the right to offset the funds and 
that funds deposited into the account subsequently were not subject to the Writ. (R. 
282). 
The Bank's answer to the Writ was incomplete and did not claim a right to 
offset though the Bank had such a right. Specifically, the response to the question 
was left blank. (R. 102). This Court directed the trial court to determine "the amount, 
if any" that should be charged the Bank for this error. (R. 283). In making that 
direction this Court noted that the trial court would be exercising its discretion to enter 
a monetary amount within the range between zero ($0.00) and the maximum which 
would be the amount in the account ($17,901.94). That range is set forth in the law as 
a part of Rule 64D(j)(2) wherein it provides that if the property is "not secured" after 
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receipt of a writ the garnishee can be liable for up to the "value of the property or the 
balance of the judgment, whichever is less." Obviously, a failure to secure property 
that is garnished could lead to the loss of its value. But the range is the measure of the 
property held; the Rule does not provide any guidance as to an amount that should be 
assessed under these circumstances except to the extent it sets a maximum. 
In the present case, there is no property that has disappeared or been lost from 
control or access in the event that Bud Bailey is entitled to the same. The Bank has 
the property; it simply asserts a prior and higher right to it. This Court directed the 
trial court to determine what assessment should be made for failure to complete an 
interrogatory, not for a loss of the funds or a failure to sequester or keep control of the 
funds. 
This Court remanded that decision because (1) the trial court had not properly 
exercised its discretionary judgment on that issue; and (2) there was no evidence in 
the record from which the Court of Appeals could base or consider such a decision; 
and lastly, (3) this type of discretion is most properly exercised by the trial court 
rather than the Court of Appeals. 
In its Position Statement, Bud Bailey misunderstood and misstated the issue on 
remand before the trial court. The trial court misunderstood this Court's decision and 
remand instructions. The trial court was being asked to use its discretion in making a 
very limited decision, namely what assessment should be imposed on a party that fails 
to complete an interrogatory. Bud Bailey, without evidence or further argument, took 
the position that the trial court was directed to award the full amount in the account 
?? 
plus legal fees and costs. (R. 306-307). If that was the correct amount to be assessed 
against the Bank this Court could have made such a ruling. It would not have told the 
trial court to make a decision within a range according to its discretion. 
The legal issues are settled; Bud Bailey had no right to garnish any of the funds 
in the account irrespective of whether or not the Bank offset the funds. The rights of 
Bud Bailey with or without a Writ of Garnishment were secondary and subject to the 
rights of the Bank. The Bank had the legal right not to remit any of the funds. The 
funds then in the account and deposited subsequently were all collateral for the 
Bank's loans. 
The issue that was before the trial court was to determine what was just 
between the parties given the incomplete interrogatory answer. This discretion is 
directed to the point at which the Bank corrects the Garnishment Interrogatory, which 
is a few weeks after the initial service; before all of the legal proceedings occurred 
based upon legal issues that were subsequently reversed. The trial court was to put 
itself back in the position of learning in the initial hearing that the Bank had a valid 
secured interest in the funds in the account giving it a senior right to the funds, but a 
clerical employee failed to note the same in its answer to the Garnishment 
Interrogatory. The Bank, in return, challenged the service process upon it. All of the 
legal proceedings and legal positions taken by the parties after that initial hearing 
were based upon legal errors governing bank offset rights versus creditor garnishment 
rights. 
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The trial court's discretion should have been exercised by an analysis which 
should have included the following steps. The trial court should have determined: (1) 
whether the service of process on the Bank of the Writ of Garnishment was proper; 
(2) whether the Bank waived that defect in service; (3) whether the failure to properly 
answer the Garnishment Interrogatory was contemptuous of its authority or simply an 
oversight by the Bank's clerical employee; (4) what evidence there was in the record 
of any damage, loss or injury to Bud Bailey as a result of the error in the Garnishment 
Interrogatory; (5) what amount of loss, damage or injury to Bud Bailey occurred as a 
result of the incorrectly completed Garnishment Interrogatory; (6) whether there any 
legal basis on which to impose a ruling of contempt upon the Bank; and lastly, (7) if 
there were damages to Bud Bailey or contempt of the court, then what amount was 
appropriate under all the circumstances to be awarded. 
In the remand proceeding, Bud Bailey chose to rely upon the previous 
pleadings as supporting all of its claims therein. (R. 306). The Bank disagreed that 
those pleadings provided a sufficient basis for the trial court's deliberation or decision 
on the remand issues. The previous briefings in this matter were directed to the legal 
issues before the court with respect to Bud Bailey's legal entitlement to garnish funds 
from the Bank. This Court's prior Opinion had resolved all of those legal issues. The 
only issue before the trial court was the determination of the amount, if any, that the 
Bank should be required to pay for its failure to adequately answer the Garnishment 
Interrogatory. The remand did not suggest or encourage or provide for consideration 
of penalties for contempt. Furthermore, there was nothing in this Court's decision 
which suggested that the full amount in the account, some $17,901.94, was an 
appropriate award. The decision noted only that $17,901.94 was the maximum 
amount and failed to note the other parameter being "if any." (R. 283). It was up to 
the trial court to determine what should be awarded solely for the failure to adequately 
answer the Garnishment Interrogatory for a defined period of time. 
1. Service of the Writ of Garnishment was improper, 
The Writ of Garnishment obtained by the Plaintiff was not served upon an 
officer, managing or general agent, or other statutorily authorized agent as required by 
Rule 4(d)(1)(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Instead, the Writ of 
Garnishment was improperly served upon an administrative assistant at the Bank. (R. 
105). As a direct and proximate consequence of this improper service, the Bank's 
response to the interrogatories failed to check the box indicating its legal right to 
offset the funds in the judgment debtor's account. The trial court's decision on this 
issue was that the Bank was responsible for the improper service because of the legal 
doctrine of respondeat superior. (R. 331). 
The requirements for service of a corporation are clear-cut and set forth in the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as follows: 
(d) Method of Service. Unless waived in writing, service of the 
summons and complaint shall be by one of the following methods: 
• • • 
(d)(1)(E) Upon any corporation ...by delivering a copy of the 
summons and the complaint to an officer, a managing or general 
agent, or other agent authorized by appointment or by law to 
receive service of process ... 
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Rule 4 (emphasis added). 
In its Ruling, the trial court treats the issue of improper service as an ".. .error 
on the part [the Bank's] administrative assistant..." (R. 331). The trial court then 
reasons that such an error on the part of the employee should be imputed to the Bank 
under the doctrine of respondeat superior. (R. 331). This legal conclusion was used 
as a basis for the trial court's decision to assess the maximum amount against the 
Bank for its failure to adequately respond to the Garnishment Interrogatory. (R. 331). 
The trial court's legal conclusions regarding service of process are erroneous in 
two fundamental areas. First, the trial court purports to place the onus of perfecting 
service on the recipient rather than the issuing party. Second, the trial court applies 
respondeat superior, a doctrine of vicarious liability, to absolve defects in service. 
All of the provisions of Rule 4(d) deal with affirmative acts that must be 
performed by the party effecting service. The Rules of Civil Procedure are devoid of 
any requirement on the recipient to ensure they are properly served. In the present 
case, the trial court incorrectly frames the improper service as an error on the part of 
the recipient, namely the administrative assistant, rather than the party carrying out 
the service, Bud Bailey. (R. 331) 
The supposed error of the administrative assistant is then imputed to the Bank 
using the doctrine of respondeat superior. (R. 331). The trial court's application of 
tort law and vicarious liability to a question of procedure is neither supported by the 
Rules of Civil Procedure nor any identifiable case law. If employees are responsible 
if, 
for errors in receiving service, and those errors are imputed to the corporation, then 
there is no purpose to a rule which requires service be upon a specific person such as 
officer, managing or general agent, or other agent authorized by appointment or by 
law. 
The application of the trial court's legal conclusions on improper service and 
the liability arising therefrom contradict the requirements of Rule 4(d) and the same is 
an error of law. Furthermore, Utah courts have held that errors of law in these types 
of matters constitute an abuse of discretion. 
".. .a trial court has abused its discretion in choosing which sanction to impose 
only if there is either "an erroneous conclusion oflaw or ... no evidentiary 
basis for the trial court's ruling." 
Morton v. Continental Baking Co., 938 P.2d 271, 274 (Utah 1997) (citation omitted).6 
In the present case, the trial court abused its discretion by applying erroneous 
conclusions oflaw regarding service in its determination of the amount to assess 
against the Bank. 
2. The Bank did not waive the defect in service. 
The defense of improper service was not an issue in the first proceeding as the 
Bank appeared, once it learned of the problem, by counsel without objection and 
responded to, and ultimately prevailed upon, the validity and nature of Plaintiff s legal 
claims. In those proceedings, the service was a side issue, not germane to or 
6
 Morton concerned the trial court's discretion to impose sanctions against a party 
who, inter alia, failed to timely respond to interrogatories and requests for production. 
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dispositive of those proceedings. However, the defect was noted. (R. 161-170). This 
Court also noted that the improper service was appropriate for the trial court to 
consider in determining the amount, if any, the Bank should pay for the inadequate 
response to the interrogatories (R. 280). There was no waiver as to the service issue 
as an element to be considered in deteraiining damages and contempt in the remand 
proceeding. 
The Bank admits that it waived its opportunity to quash service by appearing 
and answering in the then-pending proceedings. However, the Bank has never waived 
or acquiesced that the service upon its administrative assistant was proper. It remains 
a valid defense for the purpose of analyzing the Bank's inadequate response to the 
interrogatory. The trial court's decision otherwise is both a legal and factual error. 
3. The Bank's failure to claim an offset in the interrogatory was not 
contemptuous. 
The improper service of the Writ was the exclusive cause for the Bank's 
imperfect response to the interrogatory. The failure of the Bank to fill in a blank 
indicating a claimed offset was an unintentional oversight for which there was a good 
cause explanation. There is no evidence in the record whatsoever of any contempt by 
the Bank or its clerk. The Bank's bookkeeping personnel made a mistake and that 
mistake could have been averted if the proper party were served. 
The intent of a party answering an interrogatory is germane to the topic of 
sanctions. In Morton v. Continental Baking Co., 938 P.2d 271 (Utah 1997), the court 
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summarized the factors upon which sanctions are appropriate for failure to answer an 
interrogatory during discovery. These factors are as follows: "(1) the party's behavior 
was willful; (2) the party has acted in bad faith; (3) the court can attribute some fault 
to the party; or (4) the party has engaged in persistent dilatory tactics tending to 
frustrate the judicial process.59 Id. In applying these factors to the present case no 
such circumstances were referenced or discussed by the trial court. The factors were 
not even alleged to exist by Bud Bailey. The trial record is simply bereft of any 
indication of Bank contempt on which the trial court could have based an award. 
4. There was no evidence presented of damage, injury or loss to Bud Bailey as a 
result of the Bank's failure to completely answer the interrogatory. 
This Bank acted properly when it offset the funds in the judgment debtor's 
checking account. This Court recognized that the Writ of Garnishment was not 
continuing and thus did not extend to Construction Associates' subsequent account 
activity. (R. 282). The Court of Appeals ruled that the Bank's perfected security 
interest had priority over the Writ, and thus Plaintiff was entitled to take nothing from 
the judgment debtor's checking account at the Bank. Without a valid claim to the 
referenced funds in the checking account, Plaintiff did not, nor could have, suffered a 
detriment as a result of the Bank's failure to adequately respond to the interrogatory. 
Thus, the damage or injury resulting from the failure to complete the interrogatory 
would be limited to the cost of proceedings, legal fees and other incidental expenses, 
incurred by Bud Bailey prior to being advised of the Bank's legal position. 
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Bud Bailey wholly failed to provide a listing of those damages resultant from 
the mistake. No such evidence was itemized or presented. It can be estimated from 
the legal billing submitted, but even then, given the errors in Bud Bailey's legal 
theories, there would need to be an honest division by its counsel as to the tasks and 
time incurred solely as a result of the Bank's mistake in the interrogatory as opposed 
to its mistakes as to garnishment law. Without such a division, the trial court has no 
such evidence before it. 
5. The evidence of damage, injury or loss to Bud Bailey as a result of the Bank's 
failure to correctly answer the interrogatory is very limited. 
This question is what loss, injury or damage, could have been suffered by Bud 
Bailey as a result of the incomplete answer. Note, that the Court of Appeals has 
directed the trial court to determine the amount that should be ordered "solely" as a 
result of the failure to answer the interrogatory. (R. 283). So the trial court's inquiry 
was to have been limited to practical result of the Bank's error. Perhaps, the initial 
hearing and Order to Show Cause could have been the result. This could lead to an 
imposition of attorneys' fees and costs for at least a portion of those costs. 
But, Bud Bailey's attorney was advised prior to that time period of the clerical 
error. (R. 337). The decision to carry on with the legal proceedings and all the 
subsequent hearings was based, not upon the clerical error, but based upon legal 
theories which were later shown to be mistaken. Even if the answer had been given 
that the Bank offset the funds upon receipt of the Writ, Bud Bailey would have sought 
all the remedies urged in this proceeding. That Bud Bailey had an incorrect 
understanding of the law is plainly evident. Bud Bailey didn't believe the Bank had a 
right to offset upon receipt of the Writ of Garnishment and further believed that all 
funds subsequently coming into the account were continuously subject to the 
Garnishment. It is those legal errors that have carried this proceeding forward to its 
wrong decisions and the subsequent appeal, not the clerical error. 
The only possible element of loss, damage or injury to Bud Bailey would be 
the attorneys' fees or costs incurred prior to the notification and correction of the 
Bank's error. Bud Bailey never provided evidence that could be used to make this 
assessment. Clearly, the trial court's decision to simply award whatever amount is in 
the account fails to correlate with what Bud Bailey should be awarded. If there had 
been $100,000 in the account that could not have been "just." 
The corollary of awarding the full amount in the account can only be justified 
if the amount which is "just" is a larger amount and the trial court is limited by the 
peculiar sum actually in the account, $17,901.94. Hence, logically we must presume 
that the trial court felt the "just" amount was a larger sum. But there is a complete 
absence in any of its pronouncements, either in its initial decision or in the Order 
prepared by counsel, of the basis for its determination of the "just" amount. That is 
the core reason why the appeal must be sustained and the trial court's decision 
reversed. No basis for its determination is given. As such, the lower court's decision 
is an "abuse of discretion" because it lacks any capability of measurement as to how, 
why or what such discretion was based upon. 
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6. There in no legal basis for a contempt finding. 
Bud Bailey's argument to the trial court was that the Bank failed to abide by a 
valid judgment and was in contempt of the trial court and its orders. (R. 307, 399). 
There was simply no evidence before the trial court of such contempt. The failure of 
a clerk or assistant at a Bank to fully answer Garnishment Interrogatory is not 
contemptuous. This type of contempt is an error that occurred outside of the trial 
court's presence. It is a clerical error. The failure to adequately answer was not 
designed to mislead or trick any party; it was simply incomplete. In a perfect world 
these types of mistakes would not happen. Nevertheless, the elevation of this error to 
the level of contempt is without any justification. 
The Bank's error would be more egregious if a proper officer had been served 
and was answering the questions. In this case, however, it was an administrative 
assistant. Trial courts, attorneys, banks, and businesses make errors, sometimes the 
principals in these organizations make clerical errors; sometimes the errors are made 
by assistants or clerks. Every error is not contempt. There must be something more 
than a simple clerical error for a finding of contempt. A trial court should not 
casually impose contempt sanctions on a corporate organization without a reasonable 
basis well grounded in evidence of significant corporate misbehavior. 
The Bank is mindful of its duty to marshal evidence. The singular fact before 
the trial court on the question of what amount should be assessed against the Bank is 
the Bank's failure to fill in a blank on the Garnishment Interrogatory indicating an 
offset. The Bank notes that it admitted to this violation, it corrected the error as soon 
as it was brought to its attention and that there were no previous or subsequent 
violations of Rule 64D. Aside from its failure to fill in a blank on the Garnishment 
Interrogatory, there was no evidence to support the trial court's assessment against the 
Bank or a finding of contempt. 
7. If the Bank is in contempt there is a process for determining the proper 
amount is should be assessed. 
Assuming the trial court had properly determined that indeed the Bank was in 
contempt, still there is a process to determine the amount of the award with rules and 
judgment to be exercised and described. The trial court did none of this. The amount 
imposed for contempt should be just; it should have a nexus with the amount of 
injury, harm, loss or damages suffered. The amount imposed can reflect the need to 
teach recalcitrant parties respect for the court. Typically when an organization is 
subject to contempt, the organization should be punished as a result of its decisions or 
corporate responsibility for such an error. Typically, such contempt is shown by 
evidence indicating a series of incidents, a pattern of conduct, or management's 
disregard of acceptable norms of conduct. Typically, without any more, organizations 
are not punished harshly for the one time clerical mistake of an assistant without some 
additional basis. 
The amount of funds in the account which is serving as a "maximum amount" 
for an award has no connection with any determination of what is the just amount to 
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assess against the Bank. The trial court should not consider the amount in the account 
as the appropriate amount unless that precise amount or a larger amount is justified by 
the Bank's contempt in this matter. Arbitrarily choosing an amount that just happens 
to be in the account is entirely without foundation or basis. Are we to assume that if 
$50,000 was in the account, that contempt presupposes that whatever is in the account 
is automatically the proper and just amount? The law will not countenance such a 
basis. This is essentially the argument of Bud Bailey; that a clerical error by an 
assistant entitles it to whatever is in the account up to the amount of its judgment. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ADEQUATELY JUSTIFY ITS 
ASSESSMENT AGAINST CACHE VALLEY BANK BY STATING ITS 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH RULE 52. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure require that findings by the courts comply 
with the following. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury.. .the court shall 
find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon 
Rule 52(a) (emphasis added). 
On the importance of adequate findings, the Supreme Court of Utah held as 
follows. 
The importance of complete, accurate and consistent findings of fact in 
a case tried by a judge is essential to the resolution of dispute under the 
proper rule of law. To that end the findings should be sufficiently 
1A 
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by 
which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached. 
Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979) (citation omitted). 
Excepting the errors of law and fact identified herein, the trial court's findings 
in this matter are largely conclusory. The Ruling and Order thereon do not comply 
with the Rule 52(a), to wit: some facts are stated, however, they are not accompanied 
by separate conclusions of law. {See R. 325-333, 349-352). 
The trial court's findings do not provide any reason for assessing any amount 
against the Bank, much less the maximum amount permitted under Rule 64D. The 
apparent conclusion is that the Bank should be assessed $17,901.94 because that is 
what it held at the time of the Writ. The trial court's findings fail to show why the 
amount of the assessment against the Bank is just, as required by Rule 64D(j)(2). 
The trial courts findings in this matter do not comply with the Rule or 
standards established by Utah's courts. Consequently, the duty of the Bank to 
marshal evidence is relegated to the lone fact of its failure to fill out the portion of the 
Garnishment Interrogatory indicating it claimed an offset. There is no other evidence 
which supports the trial court's ruling. Due to these shortcomings, the trial court's 
decision should be remanded for more detailed findings. 
HI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEYS' FEES 
TO BUD BAILEY FOR SERVICES CONNECTED TO LEGAL MATTERS 
UPON WHICH IT DID NOT PREVAIL AND WHICH WERE NOT 
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CAUSALLY RELATED TO CACHE VALLEY BANK'S FAILURE TO 
ADEQUATELY ANSWER THE INTERROGATORY SERVED WITH THE 
WRIT OF GARNISHMENT. 
1. The trial court awarded attorneys' fees in contravention to the instructions in 
the Court of Appeals' Opinion and those authorized by Rule 64D. 
The only basis suggested in Rule 64D for awarding attorneys' fees against a 
garnishee is on the grounds that the garnishee failed to comply with the garnishment 
rules. See Rule 64D(j)(2). Consequently this Court instructed the trial court to award 
attorneys' fees, if it determined they were appropriate, and only those resulting from 
the Bank's failure to adequately respond to the Garnishment Interrogatory. (R. 283). 
In its Ruling and subsequent Order on Remand, the trial court awarded costs 
and attorneys' fees to Bud Bailey (R. 350). The Affidavit of Attorneys' Fees 
submitted by Bud Bailey as part of the Order on Remand Issue included an itemized 
billing statement wherein it claimed over fifty-four (54.66) hours of legal services; 
spanning from January 22, 2007 to April 1, 2010. (R. 339). 
If attorneys' fees were deemed appropriate, the trial court was bound by the 
Rules and this Court's prior Opinion to award only those attorneys' fees associated 
with the Bank's failure to adequately respond to the Garnishment Interrogatory. The 
defect in the Bank's response to the Garnishment Interrogatory was a failure to claim 
an offset pursuant to its perfected security interest. It therefore follows that the period 
for incurring attorneys' fees should extend only until such time that Bud Bailey was 
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informed that the Bank claimed an offset in the garnished account as that was the only 
information missing in its response. 
The billing statement submitted as part of Bud Bailey's Affidavit of Attorneys' 
fees indicates that on February 16, 2007, 1.5 hours were spent by Bud Bailey's 
counsel "[r]eview[ing] new documents from atty George Daines on [the Bank's] 
security interest and right to setoff; Atty conf with Bob re: same; review rule 64(d) on 
garnishments." (R. 337). From approximately this time forward, Bud Bailey should 
have incurred no further substantial attorneys' fees on the remand issue because it was 
informed of the information missing from the inadequate response to the 
interrogatory. 
The balance of the attorneys' fees incurred by Bud Bailey, starting in 
approximately mid February of 2006, are for services unrelated to the Bank's failure 
to adequately respond to the interrogatory. These attorneys' fees, many by their own 
description, were incurred in pursuit of actions and legal theories upon which Bud 
Bailey did not prevail. 
The trial court's compliance with an appellate court's decision on remand is 
reviewed for correction of error. Slattery v. Covey & Co., 909 P.2d 925, 927 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1995). In the present case the trial court's award of attorneys' fees was not 
in compliance with this Courts prior Opinion and Rule 64D. The issue of attorneys' 
fees should be remanded with instruction to limit the same to those incurred as a 
result of the Bank's failure to adequately respond to the Garnishment Interrogatory. 
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2. The trial court failed to adequately justify its award of attorneysT fees to Bud 
Bailey by stating its findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with 
Rule 52. 
Under the Rules and controlling case law, the findings of a court must include 
facts and conclusions of law base on such facts (Rule 52(a) Utah R. Civ. P. and 
Rucker, 598 P.2d at 1338). Similarly, a trial court's award of attorneys' fees must 
also be supported by adequate findings of fact. Rehn v. Rehn, 974 P.2d 306, 313 
(Utah Q. App. 1999). 
In the present case, the trial court was instructed to award reasonable attorneys' 
fees to Bud Bailey that were incurred as a result of the Bank's failure to adequately 
respond to the interrogatory and only if the trial court determined they were 
appropriate. (R. 283). 
The Ruling and Orders of the trial court in this matter contain no factual 
findings concerning the award of attorneys' fees to Bud Bailey or their relation to the 
Bank's failure to adequately respond. Furthermore, there is no treatment of the 
appropriateness of such attorneys' fees. 
Without adequate findings from the trial court, there is no basis upon which to 
review the award of attorneys' fees. Due to this inadequacy, the trial court's decision 
on attorneys' fees should be remanded for more detailed findings. 
1Q 
CONCLUSION 
The instructions from the Court of Appeals as well as Rule 64D(j) require that 
the award of the trial court, if any, be just. If the trial court believed that this error 
resulted in some damage then the amount of that damage should be ascertained. No 
such ascertainment was presented in the proceeding below, but theoretically it could 
only include legal fees and costs until such time as the Bank furnished information 
showing its legal entitlement to offset. That necessarily would be a very modest 
amount. The trial court completely misunderstood this Court's decision and 
instructions. 
Bud Bailey suffered no detriment nor forewent any benefit by the imperfect 
response to the interrogatory. The Bank's actions had no affect on Bud Bailey's 
rights. At most, the Bank's response to the interrogatory created a mistaken 
anticipation of recovery by Bud Bailey. That resulting disappointment does not 
entitle Bud Bailey to payment from the Bank. The sole issue before the Court stems 
from a failure to fill out a blank on an interrogatory, which was brought on by 
improper service and notwithstanding regarded funds Bud Bailey was not entitled to. 
Under these circumstances, Bud Bailey arguably should take nothing. The trial court 
erred in its conclusions of law regarding service of process and by so doing abused its 
discretion. The burden of effecting proper service is not borne by the recipient and 
the doctrine of respondeat superior is not correctly applied to obviate the requirement 
that corporations be served in compliance with the Rules. 
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The Ruling and Orders do not contain adequate findings to enable the adequate 
review of the trial court's decisions and reasoning. These inadequacies in the 
findings are in contravention to the requirements of the Rules and standards 
established by case law. 
The trial court's award of attorneys' fees does not comply with the prior 
Opinion of this Court or the Rule under which the same are authorized. The 
attorneys' fees awarded to Bud Bailey extend to matters unrelated to the Bank's 
failure to adequately respond to the interrogatory. Once the Bank informed Bud 
Bailey of its rightful and perfected security interest in the account, the defect in its 
response was cured. 
WHEREFORE, the Bank requests that the Court of Appeal reverse the 
decision of the trial court and award relief as follows: 
First Alternative: determine that Bud Bailey's failure to provide necessary 
evidence at the remand hearing to determine its damages, if any, constitutes a waiver 
of its right to conduct yet another set of proceedings to determine the very modest 
damages that result from the Bank's mistake. Further that this waiver is further 
justified by the problems of service pursuant to Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
Second Alternative: remand to the District Court with the same instructions as 
in this Court's previous Order and Remand, amplified with these further instructions: 
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1. The trial court should determine what actual damages and actual costs were 
incurred by Bud Bailey between the Bank's incomplete interrogatory 
answer and the date that Bud Bailey learned of the Bank's lien and offset 
and the legal basis for the same. 
2. The trial court's discretionary judgment should be informed that the 
maximum amount the trial court should award is 100% of the amount of 
actual damages and costs so determined and that the minimum amount to 
be awarded is zero. 
3. The trial court in making its discretionary determination should consider as 
a factor that the Garnishment service upon the Bank was improper under 
Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
4. The trial court should make written findings of fact and conclusions of law 
related to and justifying its discretionary decision. 
5. The trial court should also be instructed that based upon the facts now 
before this Court there is no evidence that the Bank was, at any time, in 
contempt of the court. 
DATED November 1, 2010. 
DAINES & JENKINS 
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N. George Daines 
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